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Stepparents, Biologic Parents, 
and the Law's Perceptions of 
"Family" after Divorce 
DAVID L. CHAMBERS 
The drama of divorce always contains at least two characters, 
a woman and a man, and often a third, a child born to the woman and the 
man. If you have read the other chapters of this book, you have rarely 
encountered any of the other persons who may be affected by a divorce, such 
as the children of either person from a prior marriage, or later spouses or 
partners of either party, or later born children of either party-all the per-
sons who are or become stepchildren or stepparents. You have not encoun-
tered them because, in this country, with minor exceptions, they are all 
ignored by the law bearing on the divorce of the original couple. 
Stepfamilies abound in this country today. Mavis Hetherington, in her 
continuing study of a group of divorced mothers with custody of children, 
has found that 70 percent of the mothers were remarried by six years after 
divorce. 1 Constance Ahrons and Lynn Wallish have recently studied a sam-
ple of divorced couples and their children in Dane County, Wisconsin, 
located through court records, and found that three years after divorce 89 
percent of the children had at least one parent who was currently remarried 
or was cohabiting with another person. In only ll percent of families were 
both parents without a new partner. 2 
Frank Furstenberg has made estimates for all American children, not just 
children of divorce. He calculates that about one-fourth of all children born 
in the early 1980s will live with a stepparent before they reach majority.3 
And many children experience a parental divorce more than once; their 
custodial parent remarries and then divorces again. It has recently been 
estimated that over 40 percent of couples who marry when one or both of 
them have children from a prior marriage or relationship divorce within 
five years of their marriage. 4 
The increasing number of children who have one or more stepparents 
has attracted the attention of the psychological and social sciences, generat-
ing within the last decade a highly productive surge of research on the 
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stepparent relationship. At least forty empirical studies resting on non-
clinical samples were published in the United States in the decade between 
1976 and 1985, dwarfing in quantity the research conducted before then. 5 
As ever, the reviewers of the new research identify critical unanswered 
questions, but all recognize the vast expansion of available information. 
By contrast, over the last decade the stepparent-stepchild relationship 
has attracted only a modest amount of writing by legal scholars.6 Why so 
little has been written is not difficult to understand. Legislators and others 
who shape public policy have tended to consider the biologic parent rela-
tionship the only legally significant relationship in a child's life. Adequate 
financial support for children is a critical social problem in the United 
States today, but stepparents are neither blamed as a source of the problem 
(even when they have divorced a custodial parent) nor widely conscripted 
as part of the solution. 
This chapter relates some of the findings of the recent research on the 
stepparent relationship and the small, halting ways in which stepparents 
who live with children are coming to be seen as legally relevant individuals 
in children's lives. In the course of the exploration, we will see that even if 
the law becomes less single-minded about biologic relationships and some-
what more attentive to steprelationships, it is not easy to prescribe what the 
legal position of the stepparent ought to be. 
I focus almost solely on the position of persons who have married a 
biologic parent after that parent has been divorced.7 Doing so permits con-
centrating on two divorces of possible interest to the law: first, the divorce 
of two biologic parents and the effects of the custodial parent's remarriage 
on the legal position of the absent parent and the new stepparent and, 
second, the later divorce of a custodial parent and stepparent and the legal 
consequences of that divorce for all three parent figures. 
The Varieties and Ambiguities 
of the Stepparent Relationship 
Any consideration of laws or regulations bearing on stepparents must con-
tend with the immense variety of stepparent relationships, a variety that, in 
one sense, closely mirrors the variety of relationships children form with 
biologic parents. The biologic parent-child relationship varies, after all, 
from the remote position of the man who impregnates a woman and never 
lives with their child, perhaps never knows of the child's existence, to the 
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central position of the primary caretaking parent, who becomes the most 
important figure in the child's life. 
The major difference between the biologic relationship and the steprela-
tionship is that most of us hold in our minds a paradigm of what biologic 
parent relationships ought to look like, a clear model for thinking about 
responsibilities and entitlements. For most Americans, the paradigm is the 
nuclear family of man and woman married to each other and living with 
their children. Even for the father who never marries the mother or lives 
with the child, we share deep-seated notions of the significance of blood 
and the responsibilities that flow from intercourse. Toward their children, 
to reach back to Blackstone, parents owe "an obligation laid on them not 
only by nature itself, but by their own proper act in bringing them into the 
world."8 We may have little agreement about appropriate roles for absent 
biologic parents in the day-to-day lives of their children (an uncertainty 
that helps create our uncertainties about the appropriate roles of step-
parents), but we at least have a fairly clear vision of the core attributes of 
biologic parenthood. 
The stepparent relationship, by contrast, lacks-and, I would argue, can-
not possibly obtain-a single paradigm or model of appropriate respon-
sibilities. As a starting point, children acquire two dramatically different 
and irretrievably "normal" forms of steprelations-the stepparent who is 
married to a custodial parent and with whom the child lives (a "residential 
stepparent," if you will) and the stepparent who is married to the non-
custodial parent and whom the child sees, if at all, on visits. Both are wholly 
acceptable relationships, yet dramatically different in terms of children's 
typical experiences in them. 
Even if we consider residential stepparents only, we still lack a single 
paradigm for the normal relationship of stepchild and stepparent. Whereas 
the biologic relationship always starts at a common point, the point of 
conception, and thus offers a roughly predictable progression over the 
course of the child's life, the residential steprelationship begins at widely 
varying points in children's lives. The child who begins to live with a step-
parent while still an infant is likely to develop a different relationship and 
bond with the stepparent than the child who begins the relationship as an 
adolescent. 
In cases in which the biologic parents have been divorced (in contrast to 
cases in which one of the biologic parents has died), the course of the 
stepparent-child relationship is especially difficult to predict because of the 
very existence of the nonresidential parent and the variations in the frequen-
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cy and quality of the visits between the child and the nonresidential parent. 
Indeed, the range of family compositions in the lives of children one or both 
of whose parents remarry is vast. Ahrons and Wallish in their study of 
divorced families cataloged, three years after the divorce, whether the par-
ents had remarried (or recoupled), whether the new partners brought chil-
dren of their own into the union, and whether the parent and stepparent had 
new children after their union. They found eighteen patterns of family com-
position among the ninety-eight couples they studied. 9 
It is thus unsurprising that in the burst of research on stepfamilies with-
in the last decade, researchers have confirmed that stepparents and step-
children come into these relationships uncertain what to expect and what is 
expected of them. As they begin a stepparent relationship, neither step-
parents nor stepchildren have available to them a set of clear norms to guide 
their behaviors. 10 As Judith Wallerstein has said, "Becoming a stepparent is 
like arriving in the middle of a very complex conversation. It takes a lot of 
effort to catch up and to keep up."11 
To the extent that we do have an image of the stepparent relationship 
provided to us from our culture, it is a bleak one. Our very use of language 
reveals an expectation that the stepparent relationship will be detached or 
uncomfortable. As a metaphor, "stepchild" describes a neglected issue or 
subject. When people are told stories with identical content with the story-
teller varying the family positions of the characters, persons identified as 
"stepmothers" are described afterward by the listeners in substantially less 
positive terms than those described as mothers, sisters, aunts, or nieces. 12 
Cinderella's stepmother was wicked. Hamlet's stepfather was evil. In 1989, 
a B-grade thriller entitled Stepfather II came out of Hollywood billed as 
"the shattering conclusion to one of the scariest films ever made." He's 
"coming home," the advertisement continued, "to slice up more than just 
the cake!" How many tales do you know of stepparents who were loving or 
kind? Some researchers believe that our cultural images of the stepparent 
increase the awkwardnesses of the relationship for those who are entering 
them. 13 
For residential stepfathers, perhaps only one aspect of their roles and 
responsibilities toward their stepchildren is reasonably clear from the be-
ginning. Apparently, nearly all residential stepfathers perform as parent in 
one important respect: those who are working nearly always contribute to 
the financial support of the children with whom they live; many in fact 
provide all the financial support.l4 In fact, demographers are now so ac-
customed to regarding children living with a parent and stepparent as eco-
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nomically secure in comparison to children living with a single parent that, 
in reporting on the status of children, they typically group those in biologic 
families and stepfamilies together under the single label of "two-parent 
families."15 
Apart from this role as provider, however, the relationship between 
many stepparents and stepchildren remains unclear and uncomfortable well 
beyond the initial stages. In his study of children with a residential step-
parent, Furstenberg found that children were much less likely to say they 
felt "quite close" to their stepparent than to say they felt "quite close" to 
their custodial parent and much less likely to say that they wanted to grow 
up to be like their stepparent than to say they wanted to be like their 
custodial parent. 16 In fact, about a third of children living with a step-
parent did not mention that person when asked to name the members of 
their family. Nearly all named their noncustodial parent, even when they 
saw him or her erratically. 
By much the same token, about half the stepfathers in the Furstenberg 
study said that their stepchildren did not think of them as a "real" parent, 
about half said that the stepchildren were harder to love than their own 
children, and about half said that it was easier to think of themselves as a 
friend than as a parent to the stepchildren. Stepparents had difficulty figur-
ing out their appropriate role in disciplining the child and determining 
how to show affection for the child. Many stepparents and children remain 
uninvolved or uncomfortable with each other throughout the years they 
live together.l7 Some researchers have even attributed to the awkwardness 
of the stepparent relationship the somewhat higher divorce rate in the early 
years of second marriages. 18 
Part of the difficulty for stepparents, as Furstenberg's questions them-
selves may suggest, is that many may believe that they are expected to be 
seen as a true "parent," an equal at caretaking and counseling, even when 
they recognize that that role is unlikely to be attainable. To be sure, not all 
stepparents have difficult relations with their stepchildren. Some-many of 
those in the other half of Furstenberg's respondents-come to see them-
selves as a parent and are viewed by children as such. Many others attain a 
comfortable relationship with the child but not in the role of a parent, 
establishing themselves over time not as an adult authority figure but as an 
adult companion and adviser. Those stepparents who prove least comfort-
able in the stepparent role are often those who find themselves stuck in the 
role of "other mother" or "other father," seen by themselves and the child 
as being in a parent role, but competing with and compared unfavorably 
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with the noncustodial parent. Hetherington's research suggests that, at 
least for residential stepfathers, the best strategy for gaining acceptance and 
building a strong relationship with a stepchild is to start slowly, supporting 
the mother in her parenting role and building over time toward a more 
active involvement.l9 
Ultimately, the difficulty for stepparents in our society may be due in 
part to a want of social imagination, to an incapacity to recognize that, 
especially in the context of divorce, it will commonly be very hard for a 
stepparent either to hold a role identical to the biologic parent or, as the 
partner of the child's biologic parent, to become just a friend. The difficulty 
in many families of finding the right name for the child to call the step-
father reveals this problem. Neither "Dad" nor "Jim" seems quite right, but 
they appear to be the only choices. We conceive the stepparent role to be 
analogous to roles we already know. We expect the stepparent to be "like" 
someone-and he or she usually falls short. 
What we have been unable to do here, as we have been unable to do in so 
many contexts in which people are perceived as different-the deaf, those 
from other cultures, those of other colors-is to learn to embrace the dif-
ferences. The residential stepparent is, after all, in the unique and poten-
tially resourceful position of being the person in the world closest to the 
person to whom the child is closest, while free of some of the baggage of 
having a long-term and biologic link with the child. Perhaps it is impossible 
to forge coherent or flexible middle views. Perhaps it is psychologically 
inevitable that children will see a stepparent with whom they live as a per-
son assigned to take the place of the absent parent. The least that can be said 
is that we as a society do not regard the advent of stepparenthood as we do 
the arrival of a new baby-as a treat that offers the opportunity for rich 
relationships. · 
The awkwardness of the stepparent relationship might be thought to 
suggest that children would in general be better off if their custodial parents 
did not remarry and that the law ought in general to discourage the forma-
tion of stepfarnilies. That is not what the current state of research suggests. 
Most children living with a custodial mother become much better off eco-
nomically upon their mother's remarriage. Whether they are typically better 
or worse off in other respects is uncertain. Research that attempts to measure 
the developmental effects on children of any life event -a parent's remar-
riage, parents' divorce, whatever-is fraught with difficulties, and thus re-
search on the developmental effects of a parent's remarriage on children is 
predictably inconclusive. Clinical studies often find that children living 
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with stepparents have adjustment problems and other difficulties, but so do 
children living with a single parent; empirical research typically finds few 
systematic differences between children raised in stepfamilies and children 
raised in other family configurations. 20 In short, insofar as the needs of 
children are concerned, economic considerations suggest that remarriage is 
typically beneficial and other considerations point in no definitive direction. 
The Law Ignores the Stepparent 
How has family law conceived the stepparent relationship? The stepparent as 
parent? As friend? As someone in between or as someone entirely different? 
Family law, as a formal matter, has largely ignored the relationship. In the 
substantial majority of states, stepparents, even when they live with a child, 
have no legal obligation to contribute to the child's support; nor does a 
stepparent's presence in the home alter the support obligations of a non-
custodial parent. The stepparent also has had no authority to make decisions 
about the child-no authority to approve emergency medical treatment or 
even to sign a permission slip for a field trip to the fire station. State law has 
had only one mechanism-adoption-to permit a stepparent married to the 
custodial parent to formalize a role with a child. 
On the breakup of a marriage between a biologic parent and a stepparent, 
the stepparent again has been ignored by the law unless the child has been 
adopted. In the absence of adoption or some extraordinary circumstances 
noted later, the law in nearly all states imposes no continuing financial 
obligations on the stepparent regardless of the extent of support he or she 
has provided while living with the child. Similarly, except in unusual cir-
cumstances, the law has not treated the stepparent as an appropriate custo-
dian for the child or aided the stepparent in continuing a relationship with 
the child through visitation. On the death of a stepparent, laws of intestate 
succession nearly always exclude stepchildren from the list of relations who 
will share in the estate. 
In the next section, I discuss scattered court decisions and unusual state 
and federal statutes that impose greater responsibilities on stepparents or 
give them more opportunities for custody of children. These decisions and 
statutes, however, have probably affected very few stepparents' or step-
children's lives, except in the context offamilies receiving welfare. The vision 
of the stepparent relationship that the dominant state of the law conveys is 
thus most consistent with an image of the stepparent as stranger or, at most, 
as a friend, a relationship that often includes warm feelings but that in itself 
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carries no legal consequence. The stepparent becomes something more only 
by adoption, an event that converts the friend into a full legal parent, passing 
over all intermediate possibilities. Katherine Bardett, in a provocative arti-
cle, has identified and criticized this view of parenthood as an "exclusive" 
status-the stepparent as either all or nothing, full parent or stranger. 21 
Another, less bipolar view of the current state of the law is possible. It is 
that the law has, without intention, created a largely neutral environment for 
the stepparent relationship, leaving it open to the two biologic parents, the 
stepparent, and the child to fashion whatever sort of relationship seems 
appropriate to them. 22 Apart from minor annoyances regarding the step-
parent's lack of authority to authorize medical treatment and other acts for 
which a parent's consent may be necessary, the stepparent can behave like a 
"mom" or "dad" day by day in the relationship or just be a friend and the law 
will not interfere. The stepparent and the noncustodial parent can share 
parenting functions in any way they wish. Stepparents can contribute as 
litde as they choose to the children's financial support without fear that the 
state will compel a larger contribution. Conversely, they can contribute a 
great deal without fear of altering the support obligations of the absent 
parent or of binding themselves to continued support if the marriage to the 
custodial parent ends. Or with the consent of the biologic parents, they can 
adopt the child, and, on divorce, if the parents agree that the child can live 
with or have visitation with the stepparent courts will typically give force to 
their agreements. 
In this view, the law projects no fixed image of the stepparent rela-
tionship-neither stranger nor friend nor parent. It is simply a relationship 
based on consent, to be shaped by the inclinations of the adults and the 
child. Of course, this neutral view of the stepparent relationship may also be 
thought unhelpful. The law's failure to announce a model or image of the 
stepparent relation may be thought to contribute to the confusion that 
stepparents feel over their expected role. Perhaps so. Yet, so far as I can find, 
no social scientist writing about the stepparent relationship has blamed their 
confusion, even in part, on the law's failure to establish a clearer image of the 
appropriate stepparent relationship. 23 
When the Law Recognizes the Stepparent Relation 
In the United States, the earliest widespread statutory recognition of the 
stepparent relationship probably occurred in the Workers' Compensation 
acts adopted by nearly all states in the early years of this century to provide 
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for the dependents of workers injured or killed in work-related accidents. 
Through these acts, some states provided coverage for all persons actually 
dependent on a worker, others for specific relations who were eligible if 
dependent. Under either approach, stepchildren actually dependent on a 
worker were typically provided for. 24 Congress, in the Social Security Act 
provisions for benefits upon death or disability, continued this form of 
recognition of stepchildren. Since 1939, Social Security benefits have been 
available to the stepchild of a deceased covered worker, if the worker had 
been living with the child for a prescribed period at the time of the worker's 
death. 25 The extent of coverage for stepchildren, however, has always been 
narrower than that for biologic children, for the latter are covered whether 
the parent lives with them or not. Nonetheless, the fact of the coverage of 
stepchildren, even if limited, is noteworthy. 
The drafters of Workers' Compensation and Social Security laws were 
seeking to ensure that children actually dependent on working adults con-
tinue to receive support when the adults are no longer able to provide it. The 
coverage of stepchildren reflects, appropriately, an awareness that step-
parents who are working almost always contribute to the support of the 
children with whom they live. More broadly, quietly, and fundamentally, the 
coverage of stepchildren recognizes the stepparent relationship as a socially 
approved relationship-persons whose coverage would not be objected to 
by employers or by other workers, those without children, who are forced to 
contribute to the Social Security fund. 
So far as I can tell, at no point has the coverage of stepchildren by 
Workers' Compensation or Social Security laws been regarded as controver-
sial. The absence of controversy probably has two sources. First, at the time 
of the enactment of the original Workers' Compensation acts and the Social 
Security Act amendments of 1939, most residential stepparents where men 
who had married not divorced women, but widows. In these families, no 
surviving male parent could have been expected to provide support. Sec-
ond, even in cases in which there had been a divorce, the coverage typically, 
though not always, 26 occured in a manner that had no felt cost to any of the 
parties. The biologic parents, the stepparent, and the child were all typically 
pleased by the coverage of the stepparent, for it came to the child at no 
greater price than any of them would have had to pay otherwise. 27 In most of 
the other contexts I am about to discuss, the recognition of the stepparent 
relationship costs someone something and someone feels like a loser: an 
absent biologic parent opposes adoption or wants to reassert custody; a 
stepparent objects to being excluded from consideration for custody or to 
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being pursued for child support; a custodial parent objects to a decrease in a 
public assistance check because of a stepparent's presence. 
Over the fifty years since stepchildren were added to the Social Security 
Act, as we are about to see, a few other state and federal statutes have dealt 
with the residential stepparent relationship. So have court decisions in a 
variety of contexts. While these official pronouncements have altered very 
little the lives of most stepparents and stepchildren, they are nonetheless 
instructive about the occasions when governments have accorded legal sig-
nificance to family relationships in the late twentieth century. 
The small changes in the law have not been due to lobbying efforts by 
stepparents themselves, for they are not a well-organized political force in 
this country. 28 They have had no voice in the legislatures comparable, say, to 
that of the senior citizen groups that have advocated for grandparent visita-
tion statutes. Rather, three major initiatives in late-twentieth-century public 
policy bearing on children have been responsible for shaping recent changes 
in the law. In large part, the three reflect a direct concern not for the steprela-
tionships themselves but for larger or different issues that happen to bear on 
them. The three are the efforts to reduce public welfare expenditures, the 
efforts to provide income to nonpoor mothers and children through the 
enforcement of child support, and the efforts to recognize and protect chil-
dren's long-term emotional ties with significant caretakers. Each of these 
policy initiatives bears on stepparents, but each is affected at all points by the 
continuing, even growing, drive to recognize and enforce children's biologic 
relationships. In America, blood is not merely thicker than water; it is thicker 
than usual.29 
The Reduction of Welfare Expenditures 
For several decades, critics have complained about the inadequacy of the 
nation's system of public welfare benefits for low-income families with 
young children. Yet, since the early 1970s, most welfare reform by Congress 
and the states has taken the form not of striving to ensure that state-provided 
grants for children are adequate for their needs but of shifting as much of the 
costs of welfare as possible from the government and onto those whom the 
state views as appropriately responsible "family" members. How Congress 
and the states have defined the responsibilities of various family members 
reveals, of course, social judgments about the significance of various relation-
ships. 
By far the largest part of the effort to shift costs has focused on absent 
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biologic parents, particularly fathers. These efforts began in 1950, but have 
accelerated in the last fifteen years with the adoption of three substantial 
amendments to the program of Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC ). Through these amendments, the most recent in 1988, Congress has 
sought to force the states to make more substantial efforts to collect child 
support from absent biologic parents. The legislation has grown from the 
perception that most children receiving AFDC have an absent parent, a con-
viction that such a parent ought to be compelled to contribute, and a hope 
that, if the states expended more effort, such parents could be forced to pay. 
(And each new piece oflegislation, as Harry Krause discusses in chapter 6, 
seems to have been successful in the sense of offsetting, even if only slightly 
more each time, the total governmental expenditures on public assistance for 
children of divorced parents.) 
Under the federal legislation, states must identify absent biologic parents, 
establish orders of support against them, and, under the newest legislation, 
require employers after 1994 to deduct from wages all amounts of child 
support that are due. Except for the first fifty dollars secured each month, the 
child on AFDC receives no financial benefit from the absent parent's pay-
ments: all moneys recovered are kept by the state and federal governments. 3 0 
Beyond its central focus on absent biologic parents, the federal welfare 
legislation includes a few provisions that deal directly with stepparents. 
These are complex, and since each state has some freedom to vary the details 
of the welfare system, they are difficult to describe simply. In capsule form, 
the federal AFDC program was originally conceived to provide assistance to 
children living with one parent only (particularly to children living with 
widowed mothers). If the child had two nondisabled parents, they were 
expected to provide for the children out of their own labors. The federal 
government has permitted but not required states to treat residential step-
parents as if they were biologic parents and thus to exclude a child fromAFDC 
coverage when the child lived with a stepparent and a biologic parent. 31 
If a state does not elect to treat the stepparent as a parent under its laws 
(and only about six states do), then it must treat the child as eligible to be 
considered for AFDC. But the state must, under federal law, take the income 
of the stepparent married to and living with the custodial parent into ac-
count in determining the child's financial need and hence the size of the grant 
the child and the caretaker will receive. 32 If the income of the stepparent is 
sufficiently high, the child will receive no grant at all. Only the income of 
stepparents actually married to the custodial parent and living with the child 
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is to be deemed available to the child. By contrast, the income of a residential 
companion of a custodial parent, no matter how parentlike a relation the 
person has with the child, may be considered only to the extent that the 
companion actually provides support to the child. 
For all its complexities, the pattern of federal welfare laws paints a fairly 
coherent congressional vision of proper familial responsibilities. Its chief 
feature is that biologic parenthood is primary, more important than any 
other relationship, entailing obligations that endure through time without 
regard to the residence of the parent or child. Only a termination of parental 
rights can end the obligations.33 At the same time, though biology is pri-
mary, the stepparent who lives with a child and is married to the child's 
mother is, by law, more than a stranger. For no person other than a residen-
tial stepparent must the states assume that the person's income is made 
available to the child. 
The welfare rules, as they apply to stepparents, are as interesting for their 
limits as they are for their reach. The federal government and the states have 
been ardent, rabid even, in their efforts to reduce welfare costs by finding 
ways to impose the costs on others, but, under the federal legislation, no 
pressure has been put on the states to treat residential stepparents exactly as if 
they were biologic parents. Nor has any pressure been applied to the states to 
seek support after divorce from a stepparent who has lived with a child for 
many years but no longer does so. Congress, however frugal, recognizes that 
there are limits on the extent to which our culture perceives stepparents as 
responsible for children. And even the statute that requires states to treat the 
income of a residential stepparent as available to children can be seen less as a 
judgment that stepparents have a moral obligation to provide support than 
an empirical guess, almost certainly accurate, that stepfathers who are mar-
ried to the mother and residing with a child nearly always do so in fact. 
The legislation requiring the income of a residential stepparent to be 
taken into account can nonetheless, like many other welfare rules, have 
perverse and undesirable effects on children. The rules work only to their 
financial disadvantage. The stepfather's income is relevant only for reducing 
the amount of public support for the child. Such a result, given the fact that 
most stepparents actually do provide support, may seem defensible. 34 None-
theless, because welfare grants, even at their highest, are so meager (well 
below the poverty level in all states), any rule that reduces the amount of a 
grant to a child creates in recipients a sense of injustice and a pressure and 
ready rationalization for evasion. Thus, rather than marry, a mother with a 
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relationship with a working but low-income man may choose to protect her 
welfare grant by living furtively in a relationship outside of marriage that 
may well be less stable and less satisfying. 35 
The Collection of Child Support for Children Not Receiving Welfare 
Until recently, most children whose parents were divorced received either no 
financial support from their absent parent or far less support than they were 
entitled to by law. The consequence was many angry custodial parents and 
their children living at even lower standards of living than they otherwise 
would have. The recent move by legislatures to increase the collections of 
child support marks the second theme that has directly and indirectly af-
fected stepparents. Obviously, this theme overlaps the first one-the efforts 
to reduce welfare costs-but it differs in that these efforts to increase child 
support payments have been intended primarily to benefit middle-class 
families. 
The two most recent federal amendments to the AFDC statute merge 
welfare and nonwelfare families insofar as child support is concerned. They 
do so through an aggressive flexing of federal muscle. In the past, the federal 
government left the content of family laws outside the welfare context en-
tirely up to the states, and the Reagan administration took office in 1981 
hoping to return even more welfare decision making to the states. Despite 
this, Congress, through the AFDC amendments, conditioned the states' full 
federal reimbursement of their welfare costs on their making more concerted 
efforts to collect child support not only on behalf of children receiving AFDC 
but also on behalf of other children with absent biologic parents, including 
those from high-income families. The United States now has a formal 
federal policy declaring the enduring primacy of the biologic relationship for 
all children. To be sure, nothing in federal law prohibits the states from 
making stepparents concurrently liable for the support of children, but 
federal law does require that, in the absence of a termination of parental 
rights, biologic parents be compelled to support their children and even that 
the amount of the support follow state-developed uniform guidelines. 36 
Independently of the federal government, many states had also been 
improving their systems of child support collection from absent parents. 
Very little of this legislation directly mentioned stepparents. A few states 
have had statutes that imposed financial liability on residential stepparents 
during the course of a marriage, 37 but, outside the welfare context, these 
statutes have had little operative content: while children are living with a 
Stepparents, Parents, "Family" after Divorce 115 
stepparent and a parent, the state has few occasions to inquire into family 
finances to make sure that parental figures, step or biologic, are devoting 
their income to the support of their children. 
During the course of a marriage between a parent and stepparent, there is 
nonetheless one set of questions bearing on the stepparent's responsibilities 
that frequently arises. These are questions about the effect of a second 
marriage on preexisting child support obligations. In most states the law is 
fairly settled: a custodial parent's remarriage does not alter the extent of the 
liability of the absent biologic parent, even though most absent parents, 
particularly fathers, probably believe that their former wife's remarriage 
should reduce the extent of their responsibility for child support. Converse-
ly, though some variation exists among states, the new stepfather cannot 
obtain a reduction of any child support he may owe for children from a prior 
relationship by pointing to his de facto responsibilities for new stepchildren, 
even though he may feel the strongest sense of responsibility (and the great-
est psychological pressure) for the needs of his new wife and her children. 38 
In nearly all states, only the biologic relationships count. A few states, how-
ever, seem to be considering rules that look at the economic position of new 
units formed by either the custodial or the noncustodial parent and explor-
ing ways to take into account the new incomes and new expenses in the 
reconstituted families. 39 
The issue of the liability of a residential stepparent for the support of 
stepchildren is also raised, from rare time to time, upon the breakup of the 
stepparent's marriage to the custodial parent. Here again, the starting as-
sumption in all American states remains that, whatever state statutes provide 
during the course of a marriage, no liability survives for the stepparent on 
the breakup of the marriage to the custodial parent. The stepparent relation 
is consensual and time-bound. Upon a second divorce, children are expected 
to fall back upon the support payments of the noncustodial biologic parent, 
regardless of the length of time the stepparent lived with the child and 
regardless of the lavishness of the support provided by the stepparent during 
the marriage to the custodial parent. This general rule has been applied by 
courts even in some cases in which a child seems to have an unusually 
compelling claim for continuing support. Thus, the Utah Supreme Court 
recently dealt with a divorce case in which a woman was divorcing for the 
second time. She had been pregnant by her first husband at the time of 
their divorce, and the second husband, though knowing the truth, had 
signed the birth certificate as the father at the time of the child's birth. The 
second husband then lived with the child for several years, during which 
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time the biologic father neither paid support nor visited the child. The 
court held that, since the second husband never formally adopted the child, 
he had no obligations to pay support on the breakup of his marriage to the 
mother.40 
To be sure, common law equity notions of estoppel might have been 
used by the Utah court to impose liability. In fact, the lower court in Utah 
had adopted such a theory-that the person who holds himself out as a 
father and behaves as a father cannot later be heard to deny that he has the 
responsibilities of a father-to impose liability at the trial level. A few 
other American appellate courts have imposed liability in somewhat more 
common circumstances-in cases in which the stepparent during the 
course of his marriage to the custodial parent had actively sought to dis-
courage the noncustodial biologic parent from having any contact with the 
children.41 In such cases, courts have sometimes made clear, however, that 
judges may not impose liability simply on finding that a strong bond has 
developed between a stepparent and child or that the stepfather has gener-
ously supported the child during the course of the marriage. Some judges 
have expressed the fear that expanded rules of liability for stepfathers on 
divorce might discourage men from marrying women who have children 
from prior relationships.42 
The very modest movement of American courts and legislatures toward 
imposing continuing responsibility on long-term stepparents stands in 
stark contrast to the law in England and Wales, where the rule since the 
1950s has been that the stepparent may be held liable to contribute to the 
support of the child on the divorce from the biologic parent if the stepchild 
had been living with the stepparent and treated as a child of the family 
before the separation.43 Rather few English appellate cases have dealt with 
trial court judgments imposing liability in these circumstances, but one 
case, characterized by a British commentator as the "leading case,"44 stands 
in marked contrast to the Utah case above. In the English case, the mar-
riage of the mother and stepfather lasted only six months and the stepfather 
lived with the woman's two children for only three months. The stepfather 
was ordered to pay an amount per week only slightly less than the amount 
ordered to be paid by the biologic father, and the appeals court upheld the 
decision. 45 
What could explain the difference in the sensibilities of the English, our 
legal cousins, and the Americans on the issue of the continuing responsibil-
ity of stepparents? One difference, which caught me by surprise when I first 
read it, is that the English rule may have originated less out of a sense that 
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stepfathers have a moral obligation to support children who have become 
financially and emotionally dependent on them than out of a sense that 
stepfathers are often morally at fault for the breakup of the marriage be-
tween the children's biologic parents. 46 The stepfather is seen as a home-
wrecker, responsible for the child's imperiled financial condition. 
A more recent statement by England's Law Commission painted the re-
sponsibility of the stepparent as supplemental to that of the biologic father 
and commented that the stepfather "shall be regarded as having taken the 
risk of having to maintain [the stepchild] to the extent that the first hus-
band failed to do so." This statement of an assumption of risk may be mere-
ly conclusory or it may reflect the commission's beliefs about what the aver-
age English citizen accepts as the responsibilities that flow from marrying a 
woman with children. 47 Whatever the attitudes of English citizens, I sus-
pect that the current state of American law comports with current Ameri-
can attitudes. Most Americans, I suspect, believe that biologic fathers 
ought to continue to pay support after a mother's remarriage, that step-
fathers ought to make their income available on top of the absent biologic 
parent's support payments while they live with a stepchild, but that upon 
divorce the responsibilities of stepfathers end. 
Will American sensibilities alter over time? Some empirical evidence 
suggests that when residential stepparents enter children's lives, the chil-
dren generally see their absent parents less often than they did before. 48 I 
have already mentioned the findings that, despite the ambiguities of the 
stepparent relationship, many individual stepparents do form strong emo-
tional bonds with their stepchildren. They are seen by the child as "parent." 
And, of course, there is ample corresponding evidence that biologic fathers 
who do not live with their children will not pay child support unless com-
pelled to do so and that they visit their children less and less as time passes, 
whether or not the mother remarries. In the future, we may come to view 
residential stepparents as replacing absent parents and assuming some or all 
of their responsibilities. 
Given the strong public support for policies to ensure adequate support 
for children without public expenditure, it is possible to imagine in the 
future the development of rules imposing some continuing liability on 
stepparents after divorce. Stepparents might, for example, be required to 
make contributions either until the custodial parent remarries or for some 
limited period of years. Stepparents, that is, would be responsible for 
cushioning the blow from the sudden loss of income they have made avail-
able to the child and on which the child has become dependent. 
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Protecting or Fostering Children)s Attachments 
Under American law as it has generally existed, a stepparent may acquire 
formal authority to make decisions in a stepchild's life or serve as custodian 
for a stepchild only with the consent of one or, usually, both biologic par-
ents. In the eyes of the law, stepparents become what the biologic parents 
permit them to become. 
Over the last few decades, changes have occurred in the law regarding 
stepparent adoption and custody that have made it easier in some states for 
courts to recognize the attachments children develop with stepparents. At 
the same time, in a manner familiar in other contexts in which judges must 
resolve children's custody, legislatures have provided little clear guidance 
from about how to deal with the cases in which adoption or custody is 
proposed. 
Stepparent Adoption. Adoption entails the termination of the parental 
rights and obligations of one or both biologic parents and the assumption 
of those rights and obligations by a new adult. A biologic parent disappears 
as a legally relevant person and is replaced by someone else. Adoptions by 
stepparen~s today typically occur, as they always have, with the explicit con-
sent or acquiescence of the parent who is about to be replaced. Laws that 
once permitted adoption to occur only when there was such consent (or 
acquiescence or deliberate "abandonment") have now, however, commonly 
been expanded to permit courts to approve adoptions by stepparents in a 
wider range of cases, including some in which the noncustodial biologic 
parent strenuously objects to the adoption. 
The new statutes vary widely among the states. 4 9 Some states have 
adopted the Uniform Adoption Act, which permits adoption by a stepparent 
without the noncustodial parent's consent in cases in which the parent "for a 
period of at least a year has failed significantly without justifiable cause to 
communicate with the child or to provide for the [child's] support."5° Some 
other states, such as California and Michigan, require a period in which a 
parent both fails to communicate and fails to pay support. A few states have 
enacted statutes that appear to make stepparent adoption much more readily 
available, permitting courts to authorize adoptions if consent is being "un-
reasonably withheld contrary to the best interest of the child."51 
Almost no information is available about actual patterns of stepparent 
adoption in this country or about the impact of adoption on the rela-
tionships between stepparents and children. For those interested in people's 
own conceptions of family and how they use laws to validate those concep-
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tions, distressingly little is known about what stepparents and custodial 
parents consider when deciding whether to seek adoption or about what 
biologic parents consider when deciding whether to consent. 52 What we are 
able to calculate is that only a small percentage of stepparents actually adopt 
their stepchildren, 5 3 despite the fact that the high proportion of children of 
divorce who never see or receive support from their noncustodial parent54 
suggests that the number of stepparents eligible to adopt, even over the 
absent biologic parent's objection, must be very large. We know nothing 
about what distinguishes the families in which adoption occurs from the 
families in which it does not. We do not even know whether stepparent 
adoptions are increasing in frequency. Because of the more generous stan-
dards for stepparent adoption and a supportive atmosphere today for step-
parent involvement in children's lives, we could guess that more are occur-
ring. On the other hand, as child support enforcement against absent fathers 
has become more effective in some states, more custodial parents may wish 
to hold onto this source of income. 55 
Just as we know little of the incidence of or motivations for stepparent 
adoption in the United States, so likewise we know almost nothing about 
the effects of such adoptions on children. No researcher has ever compared 
children who were adopted by their stepparents with children living with a 
stepparent but not adopted in order to learn whether adoption affects chil-
dren's sense of well-being or even clarifies roles within families. 56 
In the absence of empirical information, I must fall back on the adoption 
statutes themselves and on reported decisions of courts for the attitudes they 
convey about stepparents and family composition and about the values to be 
derived from stepparent adoption. The expanded provisions are themselves 
revealing for their implicit views about family. 57 The old view of the family 
was that parenthood, when the parents had been married to each other, 
persisted as long as the parent chose. The new view has two aspects. The first 
is that children form new bonds and that it is appropriate for the state to 
ratify them. The second (also reflected in neglect and abuse laws) is that it is 
appropriate to terminate old bonds when a biologic parent fails to meet 
certain responsibilities. 
What is interesting, and, in fact, a little bizarre, is the adoption statutes' 
implicit conception of the responsibilities of the biologic parent. In states 
that permit a court to dispense with the father's consent only when there has 
been both failure to communicate and failure to support, a parent can usually 
prevent a child from being adopted by the stepparent by making occasional 
payments of child support, even though the parent never visits or otherwise 
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communicates with the child in any manner. 58 In fact, in some states, the 
adoption may be prevented by support payments that are extracted from the 
parent without his consent and thus are no evidence of any concern or 
affection whatever for the child. 59 At the same time, in those states that 
permit a court to dispense with the parent's consent when there has been 
either a failure to communicate or a failure to support, an adoption can go 
forward over the father's objection even though he has visited with the child 
regularly, so long as he has willfully failed to make support payments. 60 In 
the context of children receiving welfare payments, the willful failure to pay 
support may not indicate any lack of concern for the child's well-being or lack 
of involvement with the child, for the parent knows that almost all the 
payments he makes are kept by the state and not forwarded to the child. In 
short, in some states, any amount of support money can prevent an adoption 
and, in other states, no amount of attention, no matter how great, can 
prevent one. In both types of states, what turns out to be significant about 
some biologic relationships is cash. 
The anomalies of stepparent adoption do not end with the provisions for 
defining the circumstances in which the court can proceed without the 
consent of the biologic parent, for at the core of these statutes is a more 
unsettling issue. Facing a request for adoption, the judge, even after making 
a determination whether to proceed without the absent parent's consent, is 
supposed to make a separate inquiry into whether adoption by the step-
parent will serve "the best interests of the child." In any given case, especially 
one in which the biologic father is protesting, the judge may well be puzzled 
whether the child will really be any better off if adopted. The immediate 
benefits to the child from permitting the adoption may be hard to measure-
the child is, after all, already living securely with the stepparent who pro-
poses to adopt. Custodial parents and adoptive stepparents would probably 
claim that they want the adoption to produce family unity and stability and 
to improve a child's already close relationship with the stepparent. 61 Given 
what we know about stepparents' uncertainties about their roles, they may 
be right about adoption's value for these purposes. On the other hand, as 
Jessie Bernard once commented, "It is doubtful if the kind of man who is 
willing to adopt his wife's children would be any less conscientious in his 
behavior toward the children without the legal sanction of adoption."62 
For the court, the most tangible reason for permitting the adoption may 
be that the mother wants the child to share her new last name or that the 
children can obtain access to health insurance and other benefits through 
their stepfather only if he adopts them. 63 At the same time, the judge can 
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easily perceive at least one possible harm from permitting the adoption-the 
biologic parent, now protesting, and the child will lose all legally protected 
opportunities for contact with each other, and many, perhaps most, adoptive 
stepparents expect that the child will have no further contact with the absent 
parent after the adoption. 64 
The contested cases of stepparent adoption put before judges the most 
elemental of decisions about the definition of family in a context in which 
judges can have little idea what the effects of their actions will be. Facing 
such choices, at least a few judges in appealed cases (and an unknowable 
number of others in unappealed cases) have imaginatively sought to evade 
the awesome finality of termination and adoption by straining to find au-
thority to permit the adoption while at the same time ordering continued 
visitation for the biologic parent. 65 Some other judges have cajoled the 
custodial parent and stepparent into agreeing to visitation before entering 
the order of termination and adoption and then enforced the coerced 
agreement. 66 
A comparison with England may again be instructive, for, as with child 
support, the English have sought ways to accord legal significance to biolog-
ic relationships and steprelationships simultaneously. Adoption in which a 
stepparent supplants a biologic parent has been regarded much more warily 
in England than in the United States. At one point in the 1960s, for 
example, England's Association of Child Care Officers, the organization 
representing adoption workers, recommended that stepparent adoption be 
prohibited altogether in cases of children whose biologic parents had been 
married. 67 Although stepparent adoptions are typically approved when un-
opposed, the number of such adoptions has declined significantly from the 
1960s to the 1980s. 68 Instead England has contrived mechanisms other than 
adoption to permit formal recognition of the stepparent relationship with-
out ending the relationship with the biologic parent. Together with the 
custodial parent, a residential stepparent may, under certain circumstances, 
apply for a form of "joint custody" of the child or, in other cases, for 
custodianship. 69 The English joint custody permits the stepparent to make 
legally recognized decisions on behalf of the child, but does not end the 
support obligations or visiting privileges of the noncustodial parent. 
Stepparent Custody after the Death of or Divorce from a Biologic Parent. The 
elemental reordering of families also occurs in another context-on occa-
sions when a stepparent proposes to become the primary custodian for a 
child. Sometimes changes of custody occur without hostility, with all af-
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fected family members agreeing on a placement with a stepparent. On the 
death of a custodial parent, for example, all family members may agree that 
the children will be best off if left with a longtime stepparent. 
On occasion, courts become involved in formally adjudicating a step-
parent's request for the custody of stepchildren over the objection of another 
parent, either after one parent's death or at the point of divorce. Probably no 
more than twenty-five appellate cases have been decided in the United States 
over the last two decades in which a stepparent and biologic parent have 
contended for custody. How many more cases have been decided by trial 
courts and not appealed is, as usual, impossible to say. Of course, in the 
United States today, relatively few parents die during their children's minor-
ity. Moreover, for at least two reasons, it is also probable that few residential 
stepparents seriously consider seeking custody upon divorce, let alone con-
testing the issue in court. First, most residential stepparents are men, and 
father custody after divorce, even among biologic fathers, remains much less 
frequent than mother custody in this country. 70 Second and more funda-
mental, most stepparents themselves probably believe that the children be-
long with (and to) the biologic parent. 
In the occasional cases in which judges must choose between stepparents 
and biologic parents, they face much the same ineffable choices that they do 
in the context of disputed stepparent adoptions. The appellate opinions 
recording these decisions are not a pretty sight. 71 I have read them as much 
to observe judges' attitudes toward stepparent-stepchild relationships and 
their ways of characterizing the stepparent and the biologic parent as I have 
to learn the developing state of the law. Whichever way one reads, it is 
difficult to perceive consistent patterns. The widely differing results of courts 
in these custody cases should not come as a surprise, however. The in-
coherent pattern of outcomes and the murky and inconsistent discussions of 
the governing rules almost certainly reflect our society's conflicting and 
unresolved attitudes about stepparents, even when loving, and about bio-
logic parents, even when indifferent. 
Here are some of the ways these attitudes display themselves. For dealing 
with custody disputes involving stepparents, only one state appears to have 
adopted legislation that treats them by name as potential custodians, 72 and 
only a few others provide general authority for courts to consider requests 
for custody by long-term caretakers.73 Even the Uniform Marriage and 
Divorce Act, which deals at length with issues of custody on divorce, never 
mentions stepparents and implicitly relegates a stepparent who wishes cus-
tody to search for other sources of statutory authority for any claims. Courts 
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in some states have thus simply held that they had no jurisdiction to consider 
a petition by a stepparent for custody, even after a child has lived with the 
stepparent as her only caretaker for many years. 74 
Most courts that find jurisdiction to resolve a claim by a stepparent for 
custody have to rely on legislation drafted without stepparents in particular 
in mind. Some state courts have taken jurisdiction by fiat, simply failing to 
discuss the basis for their authority to decide. Others in cases with a compel-
ling case for placement with a stepparent have stretched, brazenly, the lan-
guage of a custody statute that seemed to apply to biologic parents only. 75 
When courts have found a basis for jurisdiction, they have then had to 
grapple with the standard to apply. Are biologic parents and the residential 
stepparents competing for custody to be treated as equals or does the biolog-
ic parent stand in a preferred position before the court? Courts' opinions 
might have included revealing discussions about the importance of preserv-
ing biologic ties or the importance of preserving continuity of caretaking or 
frank discussions of the rights of biologic parents to the custody of their 
children regardless of children's needs. Unfortunately, nearly all the discus-
sion is unilluminating. Courts fuss over statements of the standard without 
explaining what considerations are affecting their inquiry. 
Consider, for example Henrikson v. Gable, a recent Michigan case involv-
ing a dispute between a residential stepfather and a biologic father after the 
death of the custodial mother. 76 The children, aged nine and ten, had lived 
in the stepfather's household since infancy and regarded the stepfather as 
their dad. The biologic father had rarely visited or called. A trial judge, after a 
long hearing, left the children with the stepfather. Wrestling with the case on 
appeal, the appellate court found two statutory provisions pointing in con-
flicting directions-one provision creating a strong preference for biologic 
parents and the other creating a strong preference for keeping children in 
"established custodial environments" under prior court orders. Then the 
court without anything that can generously be called reasoning held that the 
first section trumped the other and directed the children's return to their 
biologic father. The court drew on earlier state appellate decisions that make 
little sense either individually or as a group and at least some of which 
announce a different standard than the appellate court in Henrikson applied. 
Courts in some other states have candidly complained that the decisions of 
their own state's courts have not been wholly consistent. 77 
In a substantial number of cases, courts with a strongly sympathetic case 
for a stepparent simply seem to impose on the stepparent the toughest 
standard that that person can meet, proclaiming with vigor the rights of 
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biologic parents and the presumptions in their favor but keeping the stan-
dard just weak enough that the stepparent can win. 78 In some cases, courts 
have said in one part of their opinion that there as a strong preference for 
biologic parents but, in the end, found that the best interests of the child 
controlled and placed the child with the stepparent on the basis of a standard 
that seemed to treat the stepparent and biologic parent as equals. 79 
Not all courts, of course, go out of their way to rule for stepparents. 
Forced to choose between a long-term custodial stepparent and an absent 
biologic parent who has regularly visited, some courts have, without much 
explanation, decided that children are better off returned to their biologic 
parent. 80 Others, dealing with cases in which the biologic parent has had 
little contact with the child, seem to stretch to place custody in the biologic 
parent.81 
Courts also vary widely in the ways they depict the stepparents and 
biologic parents themselves. Appellate cases that end by ruling for a caretak-
ing stepparent typically recite at length and with warmth the child-tending 
acts of the stepparent and the passive behavior of the biologic parent. The 
court speaks of a stepmother who treated a stepchild "as if he were her own 
child" or "as a member of her own family."82 Or they refer to the stepparent 
with approval as the child's "psychological father"83 or "psychological par-
ent."84 Not surprisingly, the highest praise for stepparents in custody cases is 
that they have performed in the way the court believes an ideal blood parent 
should behave. Courts sometimes in fact have a tone of wonder: look, they 
seem to be saying, at how far beyond the call of duty this stepparent went for 
this child. 85 
The cases in which the appellate courts rule for the biologic parent have a 
different tone. In these cases, the court typically says very little about the 
behavior of either the biologic parent or the stepparent. They say nothing 
about parenting acts at all and stress instead some statutory rule or presump-
tion. When courts rely on blood, they have often found little to say. 
That courts have not acted consistently and cannot explain cogently why 
they do what they do should not surprise us. These cases in which a step-
parent and a biologic parent contend for custody are often even more difficult 
than they appear. The choice is not so simple as preserving blood ties versus 
preserving continuity, for blood ties themselves commonly offer continuity 
both in the sense of roots and in the sense of ties of desired affection yearned 
for, often by both absent parent and child, over the years. Conversely, the 
caretaking stepparent offers more than just continuity. In these custody 
cases, the stepparent has typically been living with and sharing the bed of the 
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biologic parent for many years. She or he has been caring for the child with 
the endorsement and involvement of the custodial parent. The stepparent 
has been "the person closest to the closest relative a child can have."86 The 
stepparent may not be blood, but she has been far more than a nurse or a 
friend. 
Katherine Bartlett, in her fine article criticizing America's absorption 
with parenthood as an "exclusive status," recommends dealing with cases 
such as Henrikson by fashioning rules that permit courts to order shared 
custody between biologic parents and long-term caretaking third persons or 
by ordering continued visitation between long-term caretakers and chil-
dren. 87 As she points out, many courts are beginning to find authority to 
order visitation for stepparents and other caretakers. She has even found one 
court that ordered joint legal custody between a stepmother and a biologic 
mother upon the death of the custodial father. 88 If courts and legislatures 
move toward the adoption of such rules, I hope that they tum out to be ones 
that courts rarely impose, that they will be designed instead to set a stage for 
conversations and negotiations between biologic parents and caretaking 
stepparents (and children old enough to participate) in which all come to 
acknowledge the needs of the others. 
Some Concluding Words and Reluctant Recommendations 
The starting point of my discussion of the law as it relates to stepparents was 
that there is no law relating to stepparents. That, of course, proved to be a 
mild overstatement. Still, American states today impose few obligations on 
stepparents during the course of their marriage to a custodial parent and no 
obligations after they leave the marriage. What stepparents do for children 
they do by choice. States have expanded the occasions when stepparents may 
assume the formal legal status of parent through adoption but the status of 
parent is almost never thrust on a stepparent89 and always requires the 
concurrence of both biologic parents or the concurrence of one biologic 
parent and the substantial default of the other. 
Just as the law imposes no obligations, so also it gives stepparents no 
rights in children. Biologic parents have claims in their own voice. Their 
desires for custody or visitation are usually acknowledged as important apart 
from the interests of their child. By contrast, the occasional cases in which a 
stepparent is given custody of a stepchild rest entirely on a court's judgment 
of the needs of the child, not at all on the interests of the stepparent. 
126 David L. Chambers 
In most regards, this state of the law nicely complements the state of 
stepparent relationships in the United States. Recall the inescapable diver-
sity of such relationships-residential and nonresidential, beginning when 
the children are infants and when they are teenagers, leading to comfortable 
relationships in some cases and awkward relationships in others, lasting a 
few years and lasting many. In this context, it seems sensible to permit those 
relationships to rest largely on the voluntary arrangements among step-
parents and biologic parents. The current state of the law also amply recog-
nizes our nation's continuing absorption with the biologic relationship, 
especially as it informs our sensibilities about enduring financial obligations. 
We could, of course, ask the law to serve a quite different function. Instead 
of using it to reflect current social attitudes about family, we could try to use 
it to shape those attitudes. We could, that is, use laws to announce a particu-
lar vision of the appropriate stepparent relation, seeking to clarify for step-
parents the roles they are expected to perform. But what vision would we 
choose to impose? Without some new social consensus about either chil-
dren's needs or adults' responsibilities, is there some new vision we would 
select? And, even if we developed a new vision and embodied it in rules that, 
say, treated long-term residential stepparents as equals with biologic parents, 
eligible for visitation and custody and subject to orders of support, it is far 
from clear whether such rules would lessen the uncertainties that stepparents 
experience as they enter or live within these relationships. Even if prospec-
tive stepparents learned about new laws or, more diffusely, even if new laws 
contributed in some modest way to a general understanding of social expec-
tations, most of the confusions of the stepparent role would surely persist. 
The uncertainties almost certainly inhere in the unpredictable diversity and 
complexity of the relationships themselves. 
If I were forced to recommend specific new rules, I am more confident 
about what I would prescribe regarding stepparent adoption and child cus-
tody than I am about rules I would propose regarding support. My sug-
gested rules for adoption and custody would flow in large part from consid-
erations not much explored in this chapter but developed elsewhere in the 
family law literature. 90 Both because of ideology and because of theories of 
child development, I favor maintaining ties for children with persons who 
have been important in their daily lives. Thus, I find attractive some aspects 
of the current law regarding stepparent adoption-for example, stepparents 
through adoption voluntarily obligate themselves to contribute to the long-
term support of the children and put themselves into a position in which 
they are considered appropriate persons for custody or visitation. At the 
Stepparents, Parents, "Family" after Divorce 127 
same time, I have doubts about the further attribute of adoption that dic-
tates an end to children's legally protected opportunities for contact with the 
absent biologic parent. I would thus favor exploring some of the middle 
grounds that England has been trying or that Katherine Bartlett suggests. 91 
Regarding custody and visitation at the end of the marriage of a parent 
and a residential stepparent, I would recommend that states strive to encour-
age parent figures to work our resolutions that they and the child find 
acceptable and that encourage opportunities for children to have continued 
contact with persons who lived with them for substantial periods. 92 When 
parents and stepparents simply cannot agree, I would favor in cases of di-
vorce involving young children, a strong presumption for placement with 
the parent or stepparent who has been the child's long-term primary care-
taker, 93 and, in cases in which a custodial parent has died, I would recom-
mend a presumption for leaving the child with a long-term residential 
stepparent if the stepparent has been substantially involved in the child's 
caretaking. 94 In both sorts of cases, I would almost always permit generous 
visitation with an absent biologic parent. These rules regarding stepparents 
would, by their very nature, be applied only in cases in which a stepparent 
came forward seeking a continuing relationship with a child. Nothing in 
these rules imposes obligations on the residential stepparent who never 
develops a close relationship with a stepchild and has no desire for continu-
ing contact. 
Prescribing rules for child support during and after a remarriage is a 
greater challenge. During a second marriage, if a custodial parent marries a 
person with a substantial income, should the absent parent's child support 
order be adjusted to reflect the new standard ofliving the children maintain? 
Similarly, should a stepparent with biologic children from an earlier mar-
riage be permitted to pay less support to the biologic children to reflect the 
greater expenses he incurs in supporting his new family? The traditional 
answer to both of these questions has been no. On the other hand, under 
new child support guidelines, at least a few states would apparently permit 
continuous adjustment of support at the payor's request to reflect, at each 
point, the actual living arrangements and incomes of all affected adults and 
children. Deciding on the wisest approach is difficult. Any rules permitting 
the downward adjustment of existing support obligations to take into ac-
count remarriages risks encouraging undesirable behavior-custodial par-
ents may avoid remarriage to prevent a reduction in support, and non-
custodial parents may enter into new marriages in part to punish their 
former spouses. On the other hand, any rules that fail to take into account 
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new relationships will, in some cases, lead to transfers from a payor (or family 
unit) already living at the margin to another family unit living more com-
fortably. (Consider, for example, the case in which, after divorce, a low-
earning man supports a woman and her children while paying child support 
for children living with his former wife and her higher-earning new spouse. 
These cases are not the norm, but they are not rare either.) My own pragmat-
ic resolution of this problem would be to continue to provide that the 
remarriage of either the custodial or the noncustodial parent does not, in 
itself, mark an occasion for recomputing child support but that, if the 
custodial parent or the state seeks an upward adjustment in a support award 
to reflect inflation (or the increased earnings of the supporting parent), the 
actual current standard of living of both family units would be taken into 
account in determining whether and how much of an adjustment to grant. 
Prescribing rules for child support after the breakup of a marriage be-
tween a stepparent and a biologic parent is also difficult but for different 
reasons. It is difficult because rules imposing support obligations on a step-
parent necessarily involve coercing an unwilling stepparent, and, as we have 
seen, the stepparent relationship, even among residential stepparents, takes 
so many forms. Of course, as with many rules relating to divorce today, it 
would be possible to give courts authority to compel a stepparent to pay 
support and then to prescribe a set of criteria that the court is expected to 
take into account in fixing an amount -criteria such as the length of time the 
stepparent lived with the child, the extent of support the stepparent actually 
provided, and the extent of support the biologic parents provided during the 
marriage. 
Sad to say, courts have applied similar loose criteria for many years in 
fixing child support orders for biologic children at the point of divorce, and 
most observers have been dismayed by the lack of uniformity in the orders 
produced. As we have seen, Congress has in fact now insisted that states 
develop and follow more precise dollar guidelines in fixing support orders 
for absent biologic parents. Evenhandedness in the application of loose 
criteria is likely to be even more of a problem in the context of stepparents, 
where there is no general agreement about the obligation of support at all. 
To be sure, precise guidelines might be developed for residential step-
parents-say, one year of support after divorce for each two years the step-
parent lived with the child. Such guidelines could be justified on the basis of 
equitable notions that adults should be responsible for dependencies they 
have fostered and encouraged. Nonetheless, I am uncertain what the effects 
of such rules would be on people's willingness to enter into marriages with 
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custodial parents. And what is more fundamental, I am uncertain whether 
most Americans really believe that someone who makes voluntary contribu-
tions toward another's support should be considered obligated to continue 
those contributions simply because the other, even a child, becomes depen-
dent on them. I am thus reluctant to recommend such a change in the law. 
For now, I think that states can justly continue the current rule that step-
parents cannot be compelled to provide support to stepchildren after 
divorce. 
